All my fan out there knows I am a tremendous fan of Victor Davis Hanson. RightWingNews has a post highlighting his best quotes of 2004. To that, I'd like to make one observation along the same lines of Professor Hanson.

It is an ironic historical anamoly, that the loudest and largest protests of American military actions are the very same whose freedom to do so was paid for and is protected by the very target of their rage. It is also ironic that they do so because they live under the umbrella of the greatest military juggernaut whose sole fear is using their force excessively. And it most ironic that the protests are against the very same actions designed to do today what the same actions, by a different generation, did 60 years ago. The protests are loudest where the fear of reprisal by their antogonist is least, because by the very nature of the protest, freedom is strongest, their threat is weakest, and action against totally uneccesary.

Like a patient gradnfather we watch and listen to a crying toddler, knowing that their cries will be loudest when we remove the cloak of protection they so exploit. As their society is inundated by immigrants imbued with ideas wholly antithetical to the freedom they abuse, they live knowing that like the great redeemer, when the times most turbulent, we will not forsake them. And that perhaps is the greatest compliment of all.

Okay, maybe this time it's a stretch. Maybe.

On 12/9 in The Question I write:

As long as there has been armies in the field, soldiers have complained. It is the nature of warfare. And nobody complains louder than the American GI.

He does so because he lives a free society, he's raised to beileve that questioning authority and challenging ideas is a right. But he also is willing to fight the hardest and longest to preserve that right.

Today, in the Wall Street Journal, Marine OIF veteran John Guardino write:

I enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve after Sept. 11, 2001, and served in Iraq in 2003. Throughout boot camp, combat training and subsequent preparation for war, my instructors always stressed the importance of independent thinking and initiative. Obviously, when you're in the middle of a firefight, you cannot--and must not--second-guess split-second command decisions. However, when preparing for war, thoughtful and considered questions are not only tolerated; they are encouraged--even demanded, I found.

As one of my combat instructors told us: "Marines, you're more likely to die from someone doing something stupid than because the enemy is skilled and ingenious. So make sure you've thought things through and that everyone's on the same page. Be polite. Be tactful. But don't be afraid to ask questions."

I write:

It is the very nature of a democracy to question authority. That a Secretary of Defense would even go to the troops and even field questions is something that only an American soldier would experience. However, the very same troops who question the combat equipment, are the very same re-enlisting in record numbers. They are motivated and willing to fight.

Mr. Guardino writes:

Nor does the entire hullabaloo concerning up-armored humvees show, as some commentators contest, that U.S. troops lack confidence in their military and civilian leaders. The reality is that troop morale is consistently high.

Of course, American soldiers and Marines yearn to come home; it is not in our nature to colonize or occupy a country. By the same token, however, most U.S. troops take understandable pride in a job well done. They are pleased to have the historic chance to serve and to practice, in a real-world operation, that which they have been training for all these many years. That's why re-enlistment rates are high.

The truth is that the troops understand better than anyone what is at stake and why their mission is so vital. They are willing to fight, have been doing do magnificently, and morale is high. Do they want to come home? Absolutely. Do they want to leave a job unfinished? Absolutely not.

Just yesterday I wrote in The Great Intel Failure of 2003:

All this led to the great intel failure of 2003, the failure to appreciate the Iraqi situation on the ground. We still were working under the assumption that Saddam was governing as a secular leader. He wasn't. He was actively recruiting Wahabi/Salafi clerics to preach in the newly construct mosques he began to build.

Hitler had less than a decade to create the Fuhrer Liebstandarten, that became the backbone of the Waffen SS. Saddam had nearly twice as long to create his Feddayeen Saddam, every single one fanatically loyal to him. He recuited from the poorest neighborhoods, trained them, paid them, and indoctrinated them. He sent them around the world to integrate in other terrorist organizations, and he invited terrorists, including al Qaida to Iraq.
...
While we had what we thought was extenisive knowledge of Saddam's WMD program, we had no knowledge of his massive stockpiles of regular weapons. We had no idea the level of build up Saddam had acheived, bribing UN officials, buying weapons from the French and Russians, and all the while storing them in every school, mosque, and hospital he could find.
...
The critics who complain the war was poorly planned were rigtht in the sense that the intelligence was bad. But nobody questioned the pre-war estimates. Nobody knew there was a latent, home-grown terror network. It is easy to second guess all the wrong moves of the administration. However, most of them said the same things about Afghanistan.

Mr. Guardino writes:

Nor does his question demonstrate, as some have argued, that the Iraq war was ill-conceived or poorly planned. War is, by its very nature, surprising and unpredictable; it forces us to adapt and to be innovative. Armchair "experts" notwithstanding, the fact is no one anticipated the Baathist-Sunni insurgency, certainly not the U.S. military. We all expected to knock off Saddam Hussein and his elite Republican Guard and then head home in time for the July 4 celebrations. That's why, when I deployed to Iraq in 2003, I traveled throughout the country in a standard canvas humvee with no special armor. Nor did I have any special body vest or protection.

I thought nothing of this at the time and still don't. My team went as far north as Baghdad, but we were situated mainly south of the Sunni Triangle, in predominantly Shiite Iraq. Throughout our entire time there, the Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. We were well prepared for the threat as it then existed and as we understood it.

But when my old Marine Corps reserve unit redeployed to Iraq in September, it did so with fully armored vehicles, new sappy plated vests and special goggles--all designed to protect against shrapnel and improvised explosive devices. That's because the unit was deploying to Fallujah, and the threat there was different from what we had faced in southern, Shiite Iraq.

This type of change and adaptation has occurred in all wars from time immemorial. It reflects not poor planning but the unpredictable nature of war. That's why the Defense Department has been moving quickly to up-armor its humvees, producing nearly 400 such vehicles a month, up from 30 a month in August 2003, according to Army Lt. Gen. R. Steven Whitcomb.

The last point Mr. Guardino makes is this, a very pointed and direct attack on one Senator Dodd (D-Ct) who took Secretary Rumsfeld to task. Guardino writes:

Example: When the Army decided last winter to cancel development of its Cold War relic Comanche helicopter, Sen. Christopher Dodd, a Connecticut Democrat, immediately took to the barricades. "It simply doesn't make sense to pull the plug on the Comanche," Mr. Dodd said. "Obviously, this will not be an easy fight, but I intend to work with other members of the Connecticut congressional delegation to seek to retain the Comanche as part of our military arsenal."

It didn't seem to matter to Mr. Dodd that the Comanche was a $39-billion boondoggle that the Army didn't want because the aircraft isn't suitable for 21st-century urban warfare. Nor did Mr. Dodd seem to care that much of the displaced Comanche money would be used to equip existing Army helicopters with new countermeasure systems necessary to neutralize the ubiquitous threat posed by rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, and man-portable air-defense systems, all of which are omnipresent in Iraq.

Yet Mr. Dodd, who has never been a champion of big defense budgets, now has the chutzpah to lecture Mr. Rumsfeld about the need to "spare no expense to ensure the safety of our troops, particularly as they confront a hostile insurgency and roadside bombs throughout Iraq." Mr. Dodd says Mr. Rumsfeld's response to Spec. Wilson--"You go to war with the Army you have"--is "utterly unacceptable. Mr. Secretary," he writes, "our troops go to war with the Army that our nation's leaders provide."

Quite true--and Mr.. Dodd is one of those leaders.

On only one point did Secretary Rumsfeld get it wrong. In a democracy, in our democracy, you don't go to war with the army you have, you go to war with the army Congress gives you. And thanks to the likes of Senator Dodd, the army they gave us was not equipped as well as it should to fight the wars it must.

Which is still infinitely better than the army we had even in late 1944. No, not the troops, they've always superb from Trenton to Tikrit. The problem was in a supply chain that was incapable of providing the necessary equipment, tanks lacking in armor, a replacement system that undercut morale and unit cohesion, and a broad front strategy designed to curry favor with Montgomery at the expense of shortening the war.

Is the army moving fast enough? No. The massive bureaucracy built up over years, which moves at a glacial place, has been fighting serious efforts at reform from the very same secretary who now comes under fire for not being able to get the army to move fast enough. More than a few feathers had to be ruffled when Rumsfeld picked retired Special Forces General Schoomaker to be the Army chief of staff.

The choice of Gen. Schoomaker is seen as part of Mr. Rumsfeld's effort to reshape the service from a structure of large, heavily armored divisions into a more agile force modeled on Special Forces commandos, who played key roles in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Mr. Rumsfeld hopes the smaller units also can move around the world quickly and easily.
The pick is viewed as a slap at the current roster of Army four-star and three-star generals vying for the service's top post, because defense secretaries do not usually reach outside the ranks of current active-duty officers to pick a chief of staff.

Such a move should have drawn praise from the military's critics. Instead, all it did was make more enemies, both inside the army and out. And now troops in the field, and more importantly the missions' objectives, are paying the price for such intransigence. So, Rumsfeld was moving the army, the army just wasn't having any of it. The situation on the ground was changing, and the army wasn't.

Mr. Rumsfeld has often battled senior Army officials, including Gen. Shinseki, during the past two years about the pace of his "transformation" plans for the Army.
Army Secretary Thomas White, who also clashed with Mr. Rumsfeld, resigned in April under pressure.
...
Gen. Shinseki ran afoul of Mr. Rumsfeld last year after he publicly opposed the secretary's decision to cancel the Army's $11 billion Crusader artillery program.
...
Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the private Lexington Institute, said the choice of Gen. Schoomaker is part of a massive Army reorganization drive by Mr. Rumsfeld.
"The Rumsfeld plan for the Army envisions a wholesale change in culture, a reorganization of basic combat units and a rewrite of strategy. Change doesn't get more fundamental than that," Mr. Thompson told Reuters news agency.

Somewhere, there is a story to be reported, it's just that the wrong one is. If the administration micro-managed the war from Washington, they'd be criticized. They let the generals manage the war from the field, they're still criticized. Sadly, Bush's opponents are more concerned about winning the political fight, not the fight against terrorists. Is it any wonder that I think somwhere in some bug ridden, mud filled cave that a bearded unwashed UBL is laughing.

I've written previously about Andrew Sullivan's obsession with gay marriage. In October I write:

Sorry Mr. Sullivan, you are guilty of letting your passions interfere with your reason. Do you really believe Kerry will wage an aggressive war on terror?...Why does Mr. Sullivan think that Kerry's words would betray 30 years of pacifism? Because he has one overriding selfish self-interest that supersedes ration.

Now, he posts about an article that shows married men are healthier than their single counterparts. He then comments:

That goes for gay men as well. The social pressures designed to keep them single and without family also makes them more liable to shorter, less healthy lives. So why do we have public policy that discourages health and encourages social isolation among a minority of Americans? Is the argument really that gay male health actually detracts from straight male health? How exactly?

No, actually the reason they lead shorter, less healthier lives is that by and large they lead less healthy lives. One needn't look too far to see the paucity of monogomous gay men. And no, it isn't necesarily due to inability to marry. There are numerous health issues, both physical and psychological, that afflict gay men.

Something that Mr. Sullivan doesn't want you to know. In 2001, the vast majority, over 90%, of AIDS cases are gay men, IV drug users, or both.

Something else Mr. Sullivan doesn't want you to know, that gays and lesbians are more prone to psychological and drug abuse.

But the reasons go deeper than the physical. Ida Lee Wootten reviews a book by sociology professor Steven L. Nock titled Marriage in Men's Lives.
She writes that:

Nock asserts that marriage contributes to and enhances males' images of themselves and their masculinity, driving them to be more successful, more generous and more concerned about the welfare of others. He found that marriage with its expectations, rules and customs gives husbands a way to fulfill traditional roles as fathers, providers and protectors.
...
Nock studied interviews with men before and after they were married to see how their lives changed over the years. He found that marriage brought predictable changes. Married men saw less of their friends, went to bars less often and dropped memberships in such unstructured organizations as health and hobby clubs. They were more likely to engage in functions with clear expectations, such as church.

The reasons marriage does this are numerous and yet so simple. Men and women ar inherently different, not just physically, but psycholigically and emotionally as well. Each brings something entirely different and unique into the marriage, and each receives from their spouse what they lacking. The gains one receives from marriage are only exceeded by the gifts one gives.

In my case, my wife has taught me comapssion, selflessness, and patience. She in turn has a confidence and a strength she never knew before. Times when I would have let my emotions interfere with my actions, I have learned calm and restraint. She in turn will speak up fot herself and is determined to turn a hobby into a profession.

However, the one thing that has immeasurably changed us both is raising three children. I am not even remotely the same person she married six years ago, nor am I even the remotetly the same man I was before children.

For all the rhetoric about equal rights and same-sex marriage, the arguments without exception are still selfish. It's all death benefits, property transferral, hospital visitation rights, etc. It's all me me me. I want this, I want that. Marriage isn't about me, it's about we, and now, it's completely about they, the children.

What Mr. Sullivan fails to understand is the very deep psycholgical nature of marriage, the profound impact it has on men. Yes, men and women marry for the wrong reasons, and yes, many marriages do end in divroce. But, would the marriages end in divorce were it not so easy, were it not so socially acceptable.

Without the balance, the yin and yang if you will of the opposite sex, same-sex marriage offers no oportunity to perform that most vital of marriage roles: domesticating man. Mr. Sullivan goes out on a limb to propose that the same holds true for gay marriage. Sorry, Andrew, that limb breaks quite easily.

I've written previously about Andrew Sullivan's obsession with gay marriage. In October I write:

Sorry Mr. Sullivan, you are guilty of letting your passions interfere with your reason. Do you really believe Kerry will wage an aggressive war on terror?...Why does Mr. Sullivan think that Kerry's words would betray 30 years of pacifism? Because he has one overriding selfish self-interest that supersedes ration.

Now, he posts about an article that shows married men are healthier than their single counterparts. He then comments:

That goes for gay men as well. The social pressures designed to keep them single and without family also makes them more liable to shorter, less healthy lives. So why do we have public policy that discourages health and encourages social isolation among a minority of Americans? Is the argument really that gay male health actually detracts from straight male health? How exactly?

No, actually the reason they lead shorter, less healthier lives is that by and large they lead less healthy lives. One needn't look too far to see the paucity of monogomous gay men. And no, it isn't necesarily due to inability to marry. There are numerous health issues, both physical and psychological, that afflict gay men.

Something that Mr. Sullivan doesn't want you to know. In 2001, the vast majority, over 90%, of AIDS cases are gay men, IV drug users, or both.

Something else Mr. Sullivan doesn't want you to know, that gays and lesbians are more prone to psychological and drug abuse.

But the reasons go deeper than the physical. Ida Lee Wootten reviews a book by sociology professor Steven L. Nock titled Marriage in Men's Lives.
She writes that:

Nock asserts that marriage contributes to and enhances males' images of themselves and their masculinity, driving them to be more successful, more generous and more concerned about the welfare of others. He found that marriage with its expectations, rules and customs gives husbands a way to fulfill traditional roles as fathers, providers and protectors.
...
Nock studied interviews with men before and after they were married to see how their lives changed over the years. He found that marriage brought predictable changes. Married men saw less of their friends, went to bars less often and dropped memberships in such unstructured organizations as health and hobby clubs. They were more likely to engage in functions with clear expectations, such as church.

The reasons marriage does this are numerous and yet so simple. Men and women ar inherently different, not just physically, but psycholigically and emotionally as well. Each brings something entirely different and unique into the marriage, and each receives from their spouse what they lacking. The gains one receives from marriage are only exceeded by the gifts one gives.

In my case, my wife has taught me comapssion, selflessness, and patience. She in turn has a confidence and a strength she never knew before. Times when I would have let my emotions interfere with my actions, I have learned calm and restraint. She in turn will speak up fot herself and is determined to turn a hobby into a profession.

However, the one thing that has immeasurably changed us both is raising three children. I am not even remotely the same person she married six years ago, nor am I even the remotetly the same man I was before children.

For all the rhetoric about equal rights and same-sex marriage, the arguments without exception are still selfish. It's all death benefits, property transferral, hospital visitation rights, etc. It's all me me me. I want this, I want that. Marriage isn't about me, it's about we, and now, it's completely about they, the children.

What Mr. Sullivan fails to understand is the very deep psycholgical nature of marriage, the profound impact it has on men. Yes, men and women marry for the wrong reasons, and yes, many marriages do end in divroce. But, would the marriages end in divorce were it not so easy, were it not so socially acceptable.

Without the balance, the yin and yang if you will of the opposite sex, same-sex marriage offers no oportunity to perform that most vital of marriage roles: domesticating man. Mr. Sullivan goes out on a limb to propose that the same holds true for gay marriage. Sorry, Andrew, that limb breaks quite easily.

Following up in the previous post about the great intel failure of 2003, the great intel failure of 2004 will be the complete lack of perspective as 2004 comes to a close. More than any one thing, the greatest accompishment has been the failure of both a Shia (Sadr) or a Sunni (al Zarkawi) to start a sectarian civil war. If it hasn't happened by now, then it never will.

What makes this last two years exceedingly difficult for some to comprhend, is that for the first time in our military history, we have been dealing with the aftermath of not one, but two massive victories. First, the stunning and quick defeat of the Taliban was followed by an even quicker and more stunning defeat of Saddam's forces.

In fact, the only military campaign that the US experienced initial success was in World War 1, a war the president did everything in his power to avoid. When we arrived in Europe in November 1917, British and French forces were depleted, demoralized, and in the case of the French, in open revolt.

The Czar had been overthrown in March, the Karensky gov't in October. The Bolsheviks withdrew from the war and signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, freeing German forces for operations on the Western Front.

They launched the Spring offensive and were 30 miles from Paris, which was again as in 1914, evacuated and declared an open city. Only the American forces at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Woods saved the French from defeat. Then, the Americans launched a counter offensive and defeated the German forces at the Meusse-Argonne forcing them to retreat back across their border for the first time since 1914 and sue for peace.

George Washington was hailed as a great leader during the Revolutionary war, not for his victories, but his perseverance and leadership in defeat. During the first two years of the Civil War, with the excpetion of Antietam, the South had inflicted massive defeats on the North. Even a year after Gettysburg, the war was still in doubt, Lincoln's re-election in jeopardy, and almost a year from conclusion. World War 2 was equally as dire for the first year or two. At the end of 1942, Marines were struggling in Guadalcanal, the Navy paying a terrible price in the slot, and the army about to get an expensive lesson in Kasserine. Fortunes didn't turn until the end of 1943.

In almost every major conflict in our nation's history, we have rallied from defeats to achieve final victory. Our greatest strength has been the great strength of all free societies, the reliance on the character and will of its people. Their ingenuity, creativity, and passion was fueled by the unbridled opportunity which when turned to war, can produce the most devastating results.

However, we no longer lose battles, let alone wars. We win, quickly, and we expect to do both. What we don't do now is wage total war, with the goal being total defeat of the enemy. Which sad to say, is again most like 1918. We beat, but did not defeat Germany, just as we did not "defeat" the Iraqis. Thus, for what is the first time in our history, we are operating with no historical model. The Senate's failure to ratify the League of Nations treaty, coupled with Wilson's illness, ended our influence in post-War Europe. However, no such abrogations will happen in Iraq.

The great intelligence failure of 2004 will be the critics, skeptics, and hindsight commandos professing "wisdom" about our failures and shortcomings, while forgetting that we are doing this from a position of massive initial victory, not rallying from terrible initial defeat.

When the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom is written, much will be made about the failure to find WMD's. But this is not the great intelligence failure of OIF, as everyone, from the CIA to France, Russia, even the UN, all believed Saddam had WMD's. Lost will be the real intelligence failure, the knowledge of post-Gulf War I Iraq.

The recent ruckus over armor plating for the humvees only highlights the point. All the war critics are having a field day, and even some supporters like Senator McCain. Of course the critics have been trying to have it both ways.

On one hand they said the war was wrong from the outset. After the Duelfer report, and the growing oil-for-food scandal, it is apparent that we'd never get out "allies" on board, and that Saddam was biding time until he could restart his programs. Now, they want to claim that the administration is incompetent and poorly planned the operation, which is why we shouldn't have gone to war. Flip a coin to decide? Not in national security.

The intelligence overhaul failed miserably to address the greatest direct threat we face, unlimited immigration, as terrorists are streaming into US across Mexican border. The other problem with the intel bill is it does not address what is a bigger problem, the institutional ethos of the CIA and the FBI.

Jim Dunnigan explains exactly what happened to the CIA and FBI. The bureaucratic mindset took over, and instead of intelligence gathering, they became an intelligence analysis organization. Instead of the Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan, we get real life Valerie Plame and Joe Wilson.

More and more people were analyzing less and less data. In 1996, President Clinton ordered the bombing of what was an aspirin factory in Sudan, based on data collected from soil samples taken outside the facility. We couldn't get anyone inside, be it an agent or a operative, to collect a sample.

The problem started when we began to focus on ELINT (electronic intelligence) versus HUMINT (human intelligence). If a satelitte could read a license plate, why put an agent in the field? What was impossible understand then becomes painfully and tragically obvious today.

All this led to the great intel failure of 2003, the failure to appreciate the Iraqi situation on the ground. We still were working under the assumption that Saddam was governing as a secular leader. He wasn't. He was actively recruiting Wahabi/Salafi clerics to preach in the newly construct mosques he began to build.

Hitler had less than a decade to create the Fuhrer Liebstandarten, that became the backbone of the Waffen SS. Saddam had nearly twice as long to create his Feddayeen Saddam, every single one fanatically loyal to him. He recuited from the poorest neighborhoods, trained them, paid them, and indoctrinated them. He sent them around the world to integrate in other terrorist organizations, and he invited terrorists, including al Qaida to Iraq.

It is well known that Saddam was a huge benefactor of Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, who left Egypt for Afghanistan to become UBL's #2. it is well known the Musab al Zarkawi traveled extensively in and out of Baghdad well before the war. It is well known that al Qaida came to train at Salman Pak with an aQ affiliate called Ansar al Islam, funded by Saddam. Saddam even sent exported his chemical scientists to places like Sudan to train terrorists in the use of WMD's. And of course, the bombers of the World Trade Towers in 1993 were members of Saddam's Mukhabarat. And need we be reminded that Saddam offered asylum to bin Laden before he went to Afghanistan.

While we had what we thought was extenisive knowledge of Saddam's WMD program, we had no knowledge of his massive stockpiles of regular weapons. We had no idea the level of build up Saddam had acheived, bribing UN officials, buying weapons from the French and Russians, and all the while storing them in every school, mosque, and hospital he could find.

All intelligence estimates of the Iraqi situation were wrong, from both sides of the debate. Those who thought he had WMD's had bad intel, but then, so did the world. Those who thought the sanctions worked were severely naive, as Saddam had bribed his way through the sanctions. Those who thought Saddam was under wraps, that he could be "contained" to use the common phrase, were likewise deceived. The only ones who got it right were those who said he had ties to terrorists.

The critics who complain the war was poorly planned were rigtht in the sense that the intelligence was bad. But nobody questioned the pre-war estimates. Nobody knew there was a latent, home-grown terror network. It is easy to second guess all the wrong moves of the administration. However, most of them said the same things about Afghanistan.

Were there mistakes? Plenty. The idea that we had too few troops is debatable, however, remove 20,000 of the more than 25,000,000 Iraqis, and the situation is dramatically different. Had we better intelligence on the situation, we'd have been prepared. Hopefully the history books get it right, that the great intel failure of the war was the complete lack of knowledge of post-Gulf War I Iraq. It is a problem that dates back to the cold war and the CIA, and that is the intel reform we need to address.